Is social responsibility a normal good? by Bartling, Björn et al.
  
 
 
 Working Paper No. 299  
 
Is Social Responsibility a Normal Good? 
 
 
 
  Björn Bartling, Vanessa Valero and Roberto A. Weber 
   
September 2018 
 
 
 
 
   
University of Zurich  Department of Economics 
   
Working Paper Series   ISSN 1664-7041 (print) 
 ISSN 1664-705X (online)   
   
 
 
 
 
Is Social Responsibility a Normal Good? 
 
 
 
Björn Bartling Vanessa Valero Roberto A. Weber 
 
University of Zurich 
 
 
September 14, 2018* 
 
 
We investigate whether growth in consumer income causes an increased 
willingness to pay to mitigate negative externalities from consumption. 
Correlational field evidence suggests a positive relationship between income and 
social responsibility. To investigate a causal link, we conduct a laboratory market 
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degree to which they mitigate negative external impacts at the expense of higher 
production costs. Our treatments exogenously vary consumers’ incomes. Our 
experimental results reveal that growth in consumer income causes an increase in 
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1 Introduction 
Negative externalities resulting from market activity, such as environmental damage, create 
potentially serious social problems. Public authorities may often fail to correct for market 
failures, for instance, due to lobbying, regulatory capture or other limitations inherent to 
political processes. As a result, consumer social responsibility presents a potentially valuable 
complementary approach to preventing inefficiencies caused by market failures (Bénabou and 
Tirole, 2010). However, voluntarily mitigating externalities is costly for individual consumers, 
as the prices of socially responsible products are typically higher than prices of comparable 
products that create more external costs. Thus, understanding the factors that influence socially 
responsible market behavior by consumers—and that can, therefore, be employed to increase 
such behavior—is important for policy and welfare (e.g., Danz et al. 2012, Bartling et al. 2015, 
Kirchler et al. 2015, Pigors and Rockenbach 2016, Engelmann et al. 2018). 
One potentially important factor in this regard is whether economic growth and thus 
increased income lead consumers to have greater willingness to pay in order to avoid negative 
externalities from their purchases. If this is the case, economic growth itself might play a 
critical role in the establishment of more socially responsible societies in which consumers 
voluntarily internalize their market impacts to a greater extent. As an example, if socially 
responsible consumption is, in fact, a normal good, then the substantial increases in household 
wealth in countries like China over the past several decades may yield an increased shift in 
consumer behavior toward more socially responsible products. 
Consistent with this possibility, some scholars have previously argued for a positive 
relationship between income and socially responsible behavior. For instance, Shleifer (2004) 
hypothesizes that as “societies grow richer, their willingness to pay for ethical behavior […] 
increases as well” (p. 418). Similarly, Bénabou and Tirole (2010) argue that “social 
responsibility is likely to be a normal good” (p. 1). However, we know of no empirical evidence 
that directly supports these conjectures by demonstrating such a causal positive relationship.  
One way to investigate whether greater income produces more socially responsible 
behavior is to study relationships between consumer’s expenditures and their income, both 
across countries and across time. In Figure 1, we combine cross-sectional country level data on 
GDP per capita and on Fair Trade expenditure as a share of consumer spending to provide 
correlational evidence on the relationship between consumer income and social 
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responsibility.1 The figure reveals a positive relationship, which is consistent with the notion 
that social responsibility is a normal good. However, the field data do not establish a causal 
relationship, as countries can differ in dimensions that jointly determine GDP per capita and 
socially responsible consumption behavior. For example, the population in some countries 
might be more patient and forward-looking, leading to higher levels of capital accumulation 
and GDP and to a pronounced concern about long-term effects of economic activity on the 
environment. Second, consumers might perceive fair trade products to be different from 
conventional products not only in their social impact but also in their quality. The relationship 
in Figure 1 might thus reflect consumers switching to products of higher quality when their 
incomes increase, rather than increased concern with mitigating external harm.  
 
Fig. 1: Share of consumer expenditure on fair trade products and GDP per capita in 2013 
 
Notes: Own calculations based on data from the World Bank database and Fairtrade Labelling Organizations 
International (FLO), Annual Report 2013/14. GDP in 2013 US dollars. 
                                                          
1 Figure 1 includes all countries for which we were able to obtain spending data on Fair Trade products for 2013. 
Appendix A reports the correlation, over time, between GDP per capita and the share of consumers' total 
expenditures spent on Fair Trade products in a sample of countries. We find a positive correlation between GDP 
and Fair Trade market share in 15 out of the 17 countries for which we have data on both measures from 2004 to 
2013. The data set we use for this analysis is available at: 
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/ps13e5fey99sn6d/AADrJviPp4ujzWjhOqXUvBGpa?dl=0.   
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Figure 1 highlights the challenges with attempting to demonstrate a clear causal 
connection between consumer income and socially responsible consumption. The necessary 
data require both exogenous variation in income and expenditures on products that differ only 
in the extent to which they produce varying degrees of social harm. In fact, such data is unlikely 
to exist in naturally occurring markets. Therefore, in this paper we investigate this relationship 
using a laboratory experiment, where it is possible to both vary earnings exogenously and to 
construct stylized versions of consumer products that vary only in their social impact. Of 
course, laboratory results naturally raise concerns about external validity, thus highlighting the 
complementary value of observing positive relationships between income and socially 
responsible consumption both in our experimental data and in Figure 1. 
Subjects in our experiment play one of three roles: consumers, sellers or third parties. 
Sellers make production decisions involving prices and the degree of negative externalities 
produced by a product, with products that mitigate a larger degree of the negative externality 
costing more to produce. Consumers then observe product offers and select one from the 
available options. Any resulting negative externality from a consumer’s purchase decision 
affects the passive third parties who serve no other function in the experiment. In our design, 
consumers have considerable market power, meaning that their preferences exert a driving 
force on market outcomes. Thus, we can measure social responsibility by the degree to which 
consumers’ product purchases mitigate the potential losses imposed on third parties. Using this 
design, we study the impact of exogenously increasing consumers’ incomes on their 
willingness to pay in order to avoid such negative social impact.  
Our experiment yields several insights. Most importantly, we find that increasing 
consumers’ incomes leads to higher levels of socially responsible market behavior, reflected in 
a greater willingness to purchase more expensive products that produce lower externalities. 
However, this effect is very modest for moderate income increases and is only large in 
magnitude and statistically significant when the income increases are substantial—e.g., 
corresponding in size, roughly, to the increase in GDP per capita between 2006 and 2017 in 
China.  
Second, we also observe firms’ reactions to increased consumer income. Interestingly, 
part of the increased willingness by consumers to purchase socially responsible products is 
captured by firms’ increased markups for these types of products. This observation suggests a 
potential impediment to the mitigation of social harm through heightened consumer social 
responsibility brought about by income increases—some of the change in consumer behavior 
may not result in more socially responsible products, but rather in consumers paying more for 
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such products. Firms may use the fact that high-income consumers are willing to pay for 
socially responsible products as an indication that they are less price sensitive, thereby allowing 
firms to obtain rents in serving such consumers.  
Finally, our paper investigates two other aspects of income growth, and how they may 
influence whether individuals exhibit greater social responsibility as they become wealthier. 
First, we study how the distribution of income affects the relationship between income growth 
and social responsibility. Economic growth often leads to income gains that are concentrated 
in small subsets of a country’s population (e.g., Alvaredo et al. 2013). We explore this issue 
with two treatments that hold constant the aggregate total increase in income, but vary whether 
this increase is equally distributed among all consumers in a market or concentrated as much 
larger increases for a small subset of the consumers. Second, we also investigate whether 
relative income comparisons matter, beyond absolute levels of income. Across treatments, we 
observe consumers who end up with the same levels of income, but are either in markets where 
all other consumers experience similar income increases or in a market where some other 
consumers have income shocks that are either larger or smaller. We find that social 
responsibility does not respond either to income inequality or to how much others’ income 
changes—only absolute income changes appear to influence social responsibility.  
Our paper proceeds as follows. The next section briefly reviews some related work on 
how income and wealth influence prosocial and moral behavior. Section 3 then describes our 
experimental design, while Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2 Related Literature 
Our purpose is to test the hypothesis that higher income leads consumers to exhibit greater 
concern for social responsibility in their purchasing behavior. As we note above, prominent 
economists have conjectured the existence of such a relationship (Shleifer 2004, Bénabou and 
Tirole 2010), but we are not aware of clean causal evidence in support of this relationship. 
 Consistent with our observation in Figure 1, other correlational evidence supports the 
idea that pro-social behavior is higher among individuals with greater income. This is evident, 
for instance, in studies that investigate the relationship between income and charitable giving, 
which regularly observe that wealthier individuals donate more in absolute terms, though the 
question of whether they give more in relative terms remains inconclusive (e.g., Andreoni 
2006, Vesterlund 2006, Andreoni and Payne 2013). As with our analysis in Figure 1, however, 
it is hard to rule out that other factors, such as differential tax treatment of large and small 
donations, may be at least partly responsible for these relationships.  
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A recent study by Andreoni et al. (2017) investigates whether rich or poor households 
are differentially likely to return an envelope with money that was purportedly mistakenly 
delivered to their address. They identify 180 rich and 180 poor households in the Netherlands 
using register data and send them letters containing either 5 Euro or 20 Euro intended for 
another recipient. The results reveal that over twice as many rich households (81 percent) return 
the envelopes as poor households (38 percent). This suggests that the rich households are more 
concerned with returning the money to which they are not entitled. Analysis that includes 
controls for monthly variation in liquidity leads the authors to conclude that the differences can 
be attributed to the rich and poor’s facing different financial constraints. This highlights similar 
issues to those in Figure 1—a household’s status as either rich or poor is not exogenous and 
other covarying factors may influence the differential pro-sociality in returning the envelopes 
between the two groups.  
Other, also largely correlational, evidence suggesting a negative relationship between 
wealth and morality is provided by social psychologists. Specifically, in a series of studies, Piff 
et al. (2010, 2012) examine whether upper-class individuals are more likely to exhibit unethical 
behavior (e.g. break the law, lie to get ahead, and cheat in games). Their findings confirm their 
hypothesis that having more money makes people care less about others and feel more entitled 
to put their own interests first. However, in their studies, social class is typically not varied 
exogenously, meaning that individuals with high and low social class differ in other dimensions 
than income (such as level of education and occupational status). In addition, many of the 
outcome measures involve hypothetical choices. 
None of the above studies implements exogenous variation in income. Perhaps the most 
relevant evidence in this regard comes from laboratory experiments on the impact of income 
in dictator games. Several studies conduct dictator games with varying stake sizes (e.g., 
Forsythe, et al. 1994, Cherry et al. 2002, Carpenter et al. 2005). Engel (2011) conducts a meta-
analysis of dictator games and finds that the absolute amounts shared by dictators increase 
substantially when stake sizes increase—a 100-percent increase in a dictator’s endowment 
produces an increase slightly below 100 percent in the amount transferred. Thus, prosociality, 
as measured by the absolute size of transfers to a recipient, increases with income with an 
elasticity close to 1. However, there are many reasons to be skeptical that these degrees of 
income elasticity are likely to apply to socially responsible behavior by consumers in a market 
context. For starters, dictator games possess a clear norm to share 50 percent of the endowment 
(e.g., Andreoni and Bernheim 2009, Krupka and Weber 2013). Such strong norms are 
consistent with elasticities close to 1, but limit generalization to contexts where such strong 
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50/50 norms are not applicable, including product purchases by consumers. In addition, prior 
evidence (e.g., Bartling et al. 2015) suggests that the degree of social concern exhibited by 
individuals can differ substantially between dictator games and market contexts.  
To our knowledge, only one other paper experimentally investigates whether social 
responsibility is a normal good. Friedrichsen (2017) studies markets with one consumer, two 
firms and one worker. The two firms set wages for the worker and the consumer then decides 
how much to purchase from each firm. Consumers in each session were randomized to have 
either a low or high income. Friedrichsen defines social responsibility as a consumer buying a 
larger quantity from a firm that sets a strictly higher price but also pays a strictly higher wage 
than from a low-wage, low-price competitor. In total, 13.8 percent of consumer choices indicate 
a preference for the socially responsible product. Interestingly, richer consumers are less likely 
to favor the socially responsible product (10.2%) than are poor consumers (17.7%). While 
seeming to support Piff et al.’s (2010, 2012) contention that higher income produces 
diminished concern for social impact, a few design features suggest the need for further 
investigation. First, the numbers of poor (18) and rich (19) consumers in the study are relatively 
low. Second, average payoffs for workers (29.06 points per period ≈ 0.29 Euro) are actually 
higher than average payoff for firms (26.42). Hence, a socially responsible consumer concerned 
with equality may actually want to help firms at the expense of workers, buying more from the 
low-cost, low-wage firm. Nevertheless, Friedrichsen’s (2017) results raise the interesting 
possibility that, contrary to our hypothesis, social responsibility may be an inferior good. 
 
3 Experimental Design 
In our experimental markets, firms and consumers can exchange products that differ in their 
social impact, with products that impose a smaller externality on third parties also costing more 
to produce. The experiment comprises 30 periods, with the first 10 periods (“Part I”) 
corresponding to a baseline design that is identical across all treatments. To study the effect of 
an exogenous income increase on socially responsible market behavior, our treatments 
introduce varying shocks to consumers’ incomes in periods 11-30 (“Part II”).  
 
3.1 Baseline Market Game 
Each of our experimental markets comprises 18 participants: six firms, six consumers and six 
passive third parties. The participants and roles in a market are fixed across all 30 periods of 
the experiment. Every market begins with 10 periods of the baseline version of our design, 
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where every firm, consumer and third party receive an income of 100 points. Firms and 
consumers can earn additional points by trading products, with products of varying types 
having different production costs and varying impacts on third parties.  
At the beginning of a market period, every firm selects a type of product to offer and a 
price. A product’s type corresponds to the total loss it imposes on third parties when purchased, 
which is between 0 and 60, and a corresponding production cost. The total loss is divided 
equally and imposed on each of the six third parties. Table 1 provides an overview of the 11 
possible product types that a firm can offer, the associated combined and individual losses for 
third parties and the respective production costs. A key feature of our design is that products 
that impose a smaller externality on third parties also cost more to produce. A decrease in the 
combined loss to third parties of six—and, therefore, a decrease of one for the loss imposed on 
each third party—increases the production cost by one.  
 
Table 1: Product types, losses for third parties, and production costs 
 Product types 
Combined loss 0 6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48 54 60 
Individual loss 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Production cost 30 29 28 27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 
 
At the same time as they select product types, firms also determine prices for their 
product offers.2 Products are worth 70 to consumers, independently of the degree of externality 
they impose on third parties.3 Firms are required to set prices between the production cost of 
the selected product type and 70.  
Firm’s offers are conveyed to consumers in a posted-offer market. Offers are displayed 
in a random order. After firms make their decisions, consumers see the prices and types of the 
six products offered in that period. Each consumer can buy one product but can also decide not 
to buy any product. A decision not to buy a product yields no profits for either the consumer 
or any firm, but also means no losses for third parties. There is no capacity constraint on the 
supply side; that is, each firm can serve the entire market and sell up to six units of the offered 
product.  
                                                          
2 The interfaces for firms’ and consumers’ decisions are provided in Appendix B. 
3 The fact that we hold constant the characteristics of a product other than its social impact is a valuable element 
of the control afforded by a laboratory environment. 
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The third parties are passive participants and do not make any decisions. However, their 
payoffs in a period are impacted by the types of products exchanged in the market. Specifically, 
each third party experiences a loss between 0 (whenever all consumers either only buy products 
that produce no loss or do not buy products at all) to 60 (whenever all consumers buy the 
product that produces the maximum possible loss).  
Players’ final payoffs, in points, in a given period are thus as follows:  
𝜋𝜋𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶     = 100 + (𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 − 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐)  ∙  𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑞𝑞 𝑝𝑝𝑞𝑞𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎, 
𝜋𝜋𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶             = 100 + (𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 − 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐)  ∙  𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑞𝑞 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎, 
𝜋𝜋𝑇𝑇ℎ𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃  = 100 − 𝑐𝑐𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑞𝑞𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎, 
where the quantity purchased by a consumer is either 0 or 1, the quantity sold for a firm can be 
any integer from 0 to 6 and the sum of losses for a third party ranges from 0 to 60. At the end 
of every period, players observe their own payoff. In addition, firms observe the offers made 
by all firms, how many products they sold, their payments and the impact of the products they 
sold on Participants C. Consumers observe the effect of their purchasing decision on the 
payments of the six Participants C.4 Individual subjects are not identified to one another—i.e., 
there are no identification numbers associated with feedback—and therefore cannot track each 
others’ actions across periods. 
This baseline design is very similar to the one in Bartling et al. (2015), but there are 
several important differences that are intended to mimic more natural consumer product market 
contexts. First, rather than a binary product type, our design allows for varying degrees of social 
impact, with the productions costs proportional to the degree of externality mitigation. Second, 
rather than having a product externality that has a large impact on only one third party, each 
product has a smaller impact on a larger number of individuals (see Bartling et al. (in press) for 
a comparison of these two types of external impacts). Finally, we introduce much harsher 
competition on the supply side, by allowing each firm unlimited production capacity. 
 
3.2 Treatments 
As we note above, consumers’ initial per-period income is 100 in the first 10 periods in all our 
treatments. To study the causal effect of consumers’ income levels on socially responsible 
market behavior, our design exogenously varies the size of consumers’ initial per-period 
                                                          
4 The screenshots of the feedback provided to participants can be found in Appendix C. 
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income in the remaining 20 periods. We implement this design—rather than one in which 
consumers have varying income levels from the outset—for two reasons. First, providing 
consumers across treatments with the same initial per-period income in Part I gives us a 
baseline measure of social responsibility at the consumer and market level. Second, increasing 
income in Part II relative to Part I implements differences in income growth, which more 
directly relates to our research question of whether we can expect an increase in socially 
responsible market behavior as societies become richer. Hence, much of our analysis will 
consist of difference-in-difference estimates of the responses of consumers in the treatment 
conditions who receive positive income shocks, relative to the comparable behavior in a control 
condition that implements the baseline design for all 30 periods. Our first condition is thus a 
Baseline control that implements the same per-period income of 100 in Part II, as in Part I.  
Our three remaining treatments implement positive income shocks for consumers in all 
periods of Part II. At the end of Part I subjects receive new instructions that explain the change 
in initial income for consumers and that, otherwise, all procedures remain the same. For 
comparability, subjects also receive new instructions in the Baseline. 
Table 2 provides an overview of our treatments. In a Medium condition consumers each 
receive 200 in income at the start of a period throughout Part II, while in a High condition they 
each receive 400.5 Finally, in an Unequal condition two consumers in each market receive 400, 
while the remaining four consumers continue to each receive 100. Note that this implements 
an average increase of 200, as in the Medium condition, but that these gains are concentrated 
on a small subset of consumers.  
Thus, by comparing, in Part II, the types of products purchased in all three conditions 
receiving a positive income shock with the Baseline, we can identify whether social 
responsibility is a normal good. Furthermore, a comparison of Unequal and Medium allows us 
to study the extent to which an aggregate change is influenced by the distribution of income. 
Finally, we can also compare the behavior of consumers in Unequal, who receive income of 
either 100 or 400, to the behavior of those consumers in the Baseline and High who have the 
same initial per-period income level. Note that consumers in the Baseline and those consumers 
earning 100 in the Unequal condition receive the same absolute income of 100, but differ in 
their income relative to other consumers in their market. Similarly, consumers who receive 400 
                                                          
5 These increases—doubling and quadrupling of income—roughly correspond, respectively, to the changes in 
GDP per capita (measured in 2018 US dollars) in China between 2009 ($3,838) and 2017 ($8,827) and 2006 
($2,099) and 2017. Data from the World Bank: 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=CN. 
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in the Unequal condition receive the same absolute income as those in the High condition, but 
have a high relative income in comparison to other consumers in their market.  
 
Table 2: Treatment overview 
Treatment 
Consumers’ per-period income Number of 
markets 
(participants) 
Number of consumers in 
a market (total number of 
consumers) with a given 
initial income 
Part I 
(periods 1 to 10) 
Part II 
(periods 11 to 30) 
Baseline 100 100 10 (180) 6 (60) 
Medium 100 200 10 (180) 6 (60) 
High 100 400 6 (108) 6 (36) 
Unequal 100 100 16 (288) 4 (64) 
100 400 2 (32) 
 
3.3 Procedural Details 
As shown in Table 2, we conducted 10 markets in the Baseline, 10 markets in the Medium 
condition, 6 markets in the High condition and 16 markets in the Unequal condition. Our 
objective was to obtain 60 consumers in each treatment, but the substantial cost of the High 
condition limited the number of sessions we conducted.6 We implemented a between-subjects 
design. In total, 756 subjects participated in our study, in 42 independent markets.   
Before entering the lab, each subject randomly drew a card that specified at which 
computer terminal to sit, which also determined the subject’s role. Subjects received written 
instructions, including comprehension questions that had to be answered correctly before the 
market began. An audio file with a summary of the instructions was played aloud with the 
intent to establish common information about actions, payoffs and procedures. Subjects 
initially learned only the details of Part I, but were informed that Part II would follow and 
would consist of the same kind of market activity. We provided information to the subjects 
about the details of Part II only after the conclusion of Part I. All our treatments are thus 
identical in Part I. We introduced an explicit market context in the instructions. We described 
the two different types of market participants as “firms” and “consumers” and referred to their 
actions as “trading” different “types of products” at offered “prices.” The third parties were 
                                                          
6 To determine the power of our design to detect a significant difference at the 5% level, we used the effect size 
in Forsythe et al. (1994), who increase stakes from $5 to $10 in a dictator game. The power analysis indicates that 
the probability of detecting a two-sided effect between any two treatments in a Wilcoxon rank-sum test is about 
90% if we use consumers as unit of observation and have a minimum of 32 observations per treatment. 
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simply described as “Players C.” We told the subjects in neutral language that a type of product 
“refers to the individual loss that a product imposes on each Participant C.” At the conclusion 
of Part I, subjects received new instructions stating that the market procedures would be the 
same in Part II and specifying each type of participant’s income, including noting any relevant 
changes. The original English instructions for all treatments are in Appendix H.  
We conducted the experiments using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) and 
recruited subjects using the software h-Root (Bock et al. 2014). Subjects were mainly students 
from the University of Zurich and the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich. At the 
end of a session, participants completed a questionnaire on socio-economic background, 
political views, real-world purchasing behavior and charitable giving. The list of all elicited 
variables, their description and summary statistics are in Appendix D. All sessions took place 
at the computer laboratory of the Department of Economics at the University of Zurich. 
Sessions lasted about two hours.  
 At the end of the experiment, one period was selected at random to count for payment. 
Payoffs from the experiment, denominated in points, were converted to Swiss francs at the rate 
of 3 points per CHF 1 (Swiss francs and US dollars were roughly at parity at the time of the 
study). On average, subjects earned about CHF 61, which includes a show-up fee of CHF 15. 
 
4 Results 
We define our measure of socially responsible behavior as the percentage of the total potential 
loss that is mitigated through consumers’ product purchases. Hence, if market participants 
exchange only the most harmful types of products, which impose a loss of 60 on third parties, 
they are not mitigating any loss and the social responsibility measure is 0 percent. On the other 
hand, if they mitigate the entire externality—either by incurring the maximal production cost 
or by not trading—then this measure is 100 percent.  
Figure 2 shows the time paths of this measure of social responsibility in all four 
treatments. To smooth variation, we pool the data into two-period blocks. A first observation 
is that, in Part I, our measure of social responsibility is similar in all treatments, at 
approximately 33 percent.7 The treatments do not differ significantly, confirming successful 
randomization of subjects into treatments.8 
                                                          
7 The percentage of the total potential loss that is mitigated through consumers’ product purchases for each 
treatment and at each part can be found in Table E1 in Appendix E. 
8 None of the pairwise treatment comparisons for Part I is statistically significant in two-sided Wilcoxon rank-
sum tests, neither at the consumer nor at the market level (see Table E2 in Appendix E). 
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Figure 2: Average social responsibility across treatments 
 
 
 
4.1 Income Growth and Social Responsibility 
Our primary focus is on the impact of increasing consumers’ incomes in Part II on social 
responsibility. We first focus on comparisons between the Baseline, Medium and High 
conditions. Market behavior in Part II in the Baseline allows for clean comparisons that control 
for any behavioral changes that might develop with market experience over the course of the 
experiment.  
Figure 2 reveals that social responsibility increases only very slightly in Part II in 
Medium. Indeed, Baseline and Medium are not statistically significantly different in Part II 
(two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum tests at the consumer (market) level, p=0.83 (0.65)). However, 
Figure 2 shows that social responsibility increases substantially in Part II in High. The 
difference between Baseline and High is statistically significant in Part II (two-sided Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test, at the consumer (market) level, p=0.00 (0.04)), as is the difference between 
Medium and High (p=0.00 (0.01)).   
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Table 3: GLS (random-effects) regression of social responsibility measure 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Medium -3.700 -3.467 -0.023 
 (9.463) (10.093) (9.591) 
High -8.394 -8.582 -7.667 
 (13.079) (13.423) (12.673) 
Unequal -8.325 -9.643 -7.712 
 (8.853) (9.600) (9.007) 
Part II 7.300* 7.473* 7.473* 
 (3.843) (4.123) (4.124) 
Part II x Medium 1.308 2.334 2.334 
 (6.340) (6.460) (6.463) 
Part II x High 37.686*** 36.693*** 36.693*** 
 (8.396) (9.625) (9.629) 
Part II x Unequal 3.710 3.581 3.581 
 (4.933) (5.231) (5.233) 
Disposable income (log)   -7.203*** 
   (2.775) 
Responsible consumption   12.212*** 
   (4.121) 
Donation to charity   0.017*** 
   (0.004) 
Political orientation (right)   -2.650** 
   (1.288) 
Constant 37.950*** 38.643*** 49.807 
 (8.058) (8.782) (42.875) 
Controls for age and gender no no yes 
Observations 7,560 7,170 7,170 
Number of subjects 252 239 239 
Notes: Medium, High and Unequal are binary variables taking on value 1 in the respective treatments and 0 
otherwise. Part II is a binary variable taking on value 1 for data from period 11 to 30 and 0 otherwise. Baseline 
and Part I serve as omitted categories. Disposable income is the natural logarithm of subjects’ self-reported 
disposable monthly income. Responsible consumption is a binary variable taking on value 1 if subjects “often” 
or “always” buy socially responsible products (and 0 if they “sometimes” or “never” buy them). Donation to 
charity are self-reported donations to charitable causes (in CHF) per year. Political orientation captures subjects’ 
political preferences on a nine-point scale, ranging from “very left-wing” to “very right-wing.” We have only 
239 subjects in models (2) and (3) because 13 subjects did not declare either their disposable income or their 
responsible consumption behavior. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the market level. * 
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 
Table 3 presents regressions that complement these observations. The table reports 
coefficient estimates of random-effects regressions using a consumer’s purchasing decision in 
a period as the unit of observation. The dependent variable is our measure of social 
responsibility (percent loss mitigated). To accommodate market heterogeneity, we use a 
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generalized least-squares (GLS) panel structure with random effects at the consumer level. We 
employ a standard differences-in-differences structure for panel data to examine treatment 
effects in Part II conditional on behavior in Part I. In Model (1) we include binary treatment 
variables, Medium, High and Unequal, taking on value 1 in the respective treatments and 0 
otherwise, a binary variable Part II, taking on value 1 for data from periods 11 to 30 and 0 
otherwise and interactions of the treatment variables with Part II. Baseline and Part I serve as 
omitted categories.  
Model (2) repeats this analysis using only consumers for whom we have complete 
information on individual characteristics collected in the post-experimental questionnaire, 
which has little substantive effect on the results. Model (3) introduces these individual 
characteristics as explanatory variables. Disposable income refers to (the natural logarithm of) 
subjects’ self-reported disposable monthly income (i.e., after housing costs). Responsible 
consumption indicates how often a subject buys socially responsible products; subjects could 
select “always,” “often,” “sometimes,” or “never;” we collapse this into two roughly equally-
sized categories: sometimes/never (0) and often/always (1). Donation to charity corresponds 
to the amount donated (in CHF) per year to charitable causes. Finally, Political orientation 
captures subjects’ political preferences, ranging from 1 if they consider themselves very much 
on the left of the political spectrum to 9 if they consider themselves on the right extreme. We 
also include, in addition, controls for age and gender. 
Across all models, the positive coefficients for Part II x Medium indicate slightly 
increased concern for social impact when consumers’ initial income increases from 100 to 200, 
but the impact is small and not statistically significant. We observe similarly small and positive, 
but statistically insignificant, effects for the Unequal condition in Part II. However, the 
coefficient for Part II x High is positive, much larger in magnitude and significant at the one 
percent level. This confirms a large impact on socially responsible consumption when income 
increases substantially.  
We can also directly estimate the effects of income levels on socially responsible 
consumption. Table 4 presents results from regressions of our measure of social responsibility 
on a consumer’s income in a period, using data from all treatments. The identification of 
income effects in this regression comes from the variation between subjects and across time in 
the size of the per-period income. Both models use the level of socially responsible 
consumption as the dependent variable and the level of income as an explanatory variable, 
revealing a positive and statistically significant relationship. An increase of 100 units of income 
leads to an increase of roughly 12 in our measure of social responsibility. The positive and 
 
 
15 
statistically significant coefficients for Income are consistent with the interpretation that 
socially responsible consumption is a normal good. 
 
Table 4: GLS (random-effects) regression of social responsibility  
 (1) (2) 
Income  0.121*** 0.115*** 
 (0.016) (0.017) 
Period  0.114 
  (0.098) 
Constant 21.725*** 21.067*** 
 (4.096) (4.026) 
Observations 7,560 7,560 
Number of subjects 252 252 
Notes. The dependent variable in Models (1) and (2) is the percent loss mitigated. The variable 
Income represents subjects’ per-period income (100, 200 or 400). Model (2) includes the 
variable Period taking on integer values between 1 and 30. Standard errors (in parentheses) are 
clustered at the market level. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 
The coefficient estimates in Models (1) and (2) of Table 4 also allow us to derive 
elasticities for the responses of social responsibility to increases in income.9 This yields 
elasticity estimates of approximately 0.55.10 Of course, these elasticity estimates from behavior 
in laboratory experiments should not be interpreted as likely to be particularly informative 
about comparable real-world income elasticities for the many different ways in which 
consumers can exhibit social responsibility in response to changing income. However, in the 
context of our experiment, they indicate a moderate level of responsiveness.  
Returning to Table 3, Model (3) also yields some interesting insights regarding factors 
affecting socially responsible consumption. First, the coefficient on Responsible consumption 
is positive and statistically significant, revealing that those subjects who report more frequently 
consuming socially responsible products outside the laboratory also act more socially 
responsibly in our experimental markets. Second, the coefficient on Donation to charity is 
positive and highly significant, suggesting that subjects who report giving more to charity act 
more socially responsibly in our markets (see Sutter et al., 2016, for a comparable finding). 
                                                          
9 Specifically, let social responsibility (the percent loss mitigated) be 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆0 and 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1 before and after income 
changes, respectively, and let ∆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1 − 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆0. Let 𝑌𝑌0 and 𝑌𝑌1 denote the corresponding per-period income 
levels and let ∆𝑌𝑌 = 𝑌𝑌1 − 𝑌𝑌0. We calculate income elasticities as 𝜂𝜂 = Δ𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆/Δ𝑌𝑌 ∙ 𝑌𝑌0/𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆0.  
10 In Table 3, using the estimates in Model (1), this yields estimated income elasticities in the range of 0.25 (in 
treatment Medium) to 0.51 (in treatment High). 
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Third, the coefficient for Political orientation is negative and marginally statistically 
significant, suggesting that subjects who classify themselves toward the right of the political 
spectrum are less likely to exhibit socially responsible market behavior (see Sutter et al., 2016, 
and Cappelen et al., 2015, for comparable findings). Most interestingly for our main research 
question, the coefficient on Disposable income is negative and statistically significant, 
indicating that subjects with higher self-reported income levels outside the laboratory act less 
socially responsibly in our experimental markets. While our data are based on a student sample 
and might thus be of limited significance when it comes to interpreting variation in income 
levels outside the laboratory, this unexpected observation is interesting in light of work 
demonstrating negative relationships between income and social responsibility (e.g., Piff et al. 
2010, 2012). It raises the possibility that wealthier individuals may be less pro-social than ones 
with lower incomes—perhaps due to many possible factors including selection into higher 
earnings—while the effects of our treatments suggest that the effects of exogenous income 
increases are positive.11 
 
4.2 Relative Income and Social Responsibility  
We next more closely study the Unequal condition, to investigate whether income inequality 
affects the relationship between income and social responsibility. Figure 2 shows that, on 
aggregate, the degree of socially responsible consumption in the Unequal condition is very 
similar to that in the Medium condition, both of which have the same aggregate income 
increases. Indeed, the measures of social responsibility in Unequal and Medium are not 
significantly different in Part II (two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test, at the consumer (market) 
level, p=0.58 (0.71)). This is also reflected in the coefficient estimates for Unequal in Table 3, 
which show small positive, but statistically insignificant, estimates that are similar in 
magnitude to those for the Medium condition.12 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 Table E3 in Appendix E reports further regression specifications, where we use alternative self-reported 
measures of income, responsible consumption behavior and political views. The results are substantively similar 
in these regression specifications. One observation is that the coefficient on Family income (“Approximately, what 
was the highest total gross income obtained by your parents in any past year?”) is positive and statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level. This is again in line with the correlational evidence discussed at the beginning 
of the paper. The inconsistency between Family income and Disposable income suggests that any interpretation 
of these self-reported measures must be done very cautiously. 
12 A post-estimation test of equality of the coefficients for Part II x Unequal and Part II x Medium in Model (1) 
fails to reject equality (p=0.68). 
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Figure 3: Average social responsibility in treatment Unequal by income class 
  
 
While the aggregate response to a positive income shock is small in the Unequal 
condition, we observe larger effects when we consider only those consumers whose income 
increased. Figure 3 shows that consumers whose initial per-period income increases from 100 
in Part I to 400 in Part II in Unequal demonstrate considerably higher levels of social 
responsibility, while those consumers whose income remains at 100 demonstrate little change 
in their behavior. This observation is supported by the regression analysis reported in Model 
(1) in Table 5. This regression includes only observations from the Unequal condition to study 
how social responsibility is affected by the income shock experienced by two out of the six 
consumers in each market. Income of 400 is a binary variable taking on value 1 in case a 
consumer receives an initial per-period income of 400 in Part II and 0 otherwise. We find that 
the coefficient for Part II x Income of 400 is positive and statistically significant, indicating 
that consumers whose initial income increases from 100 to 400 exhibit a substantially higher 
level of socially responsible behavior than consumers whose initial income stays constant at 
100. This finding supports our earlier analysis comparing the Baseline and High conditions, 
finding that a substantial income increase (from 100 to 400) fosters increased socially 
responsible market behavior. However, in the case where there are only two consumers with 
the large income increase, the effect of their increased social responsibility is not sufficient to 
produce a large impact on aggregate behavior. 
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Table 5: GLS (random-effects) regression of social responsibility  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Income of 400 3.516   
 (7.004)   
Unequal  -9.497 2.413 
  (8.935) (12.408) 
Part II 1.883 7.300* 44.986*** 
 (2.124) (3.872) (7.551) 
Part II x Income of 400 27.383***   
 (4.931)   
Part II x Unequal  -5.417 -15.720 
  (4.403) (9.666) 
Constant 28.453*** 37.950*** 29.556*** 
 (3.780) (8.118) (10.421) 
Observations 2,880 3,720 2,040 
Number of subjects 96 124 68 
Notes: Model (1) considers only observations from the Unequal treatment. Model (2) considers only 
observations from consumers who receive an income of 100 in Part II (Unequal and Baseline). Model 
(3) considers only observations from consumers who receive an income of 400 in Part II (Unequal and 
High). Income of 400 is a binary variable taking on value 1 in case a consumer receives an income of 
400 in Part II and 0 otherwise. Unequal is a binary variable taking on value 1 in case of treatment 
Unequal and 0 otherwise. Part II is a binary variable taking on value 1 for observations from Part II 
and 0 otherwise. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the market level. * significant at 10%, 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.  
 
The Unequal condition also allows us to investigate how relative income comparisons 
influence socially responsible market behavior. First, recall that the behavior of consumers who 
receive 100 in Part II in the Baseline, where all consumers receive 100, changes little from their 
behavior in Part I (see Figure 2 and Table 3). Our design allows us to compare the behavior of 
these consumers to the behavior of subjects who receive 100 in the Unequal condition, where 
some other consumers receive 400. Even though both sets of consumers experience no income 
changes, the latter may react to the presence of income changes among others in their market. 
However, Figure 3 reveals that the behavior of these consumers changes very little from Part I 
to Part II. This is confirmed in Model (2) in Table 4, which uses only observations from subjects 
who received income of 100 in Part II in the Baseline and Unequal conditions. We find that 
the interaction term Part II x Unequal is small, negative and statistically insignificant. Second, 
we can also compare socially responsible behavior in Part II by consumers who receive 400 in 
the High condition, where all consumers receive similar income shocks, to the behavior of the 
subset of consumers who receive 400 in the Unequal condition. Model (3) in Table 4 considers 
only observations from these two classes of subjects. The interaction term Part II x Unequal is 
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negative and sizable in magnitude, suggesting that the response to a positive income shock is 
smaller when other consumers simultaneously experience smaller shocks. However, the 
coefficient is not statistically significantly different from zero. Based on these results, we 
conclude that relative income comparisons do not appear to have large and robust effects on 
consumers’ social responsibility.  
 
4.3 Prices and Markups  
Thus far, we have focused on the composition of product types—in particular, the extent to 
which traded products impose externalities on third parties—as our primary measure of 
consumer social responsibility, and how it is affected by increases in income. We next consider 
whether income changes also result in changes in the prices paid by consumers. Recall that all 
product types have the same value to consumers in material terms, meaning that a greater 
willingness to pay for more socially responsible products likely reflects an increased concern 
for mitigating negative impacts.  
 
Figure 4: Average price paid 
 
Notes: The figure shows average prices for all completed transactions.  
 
We first report average prices paid by consumers, pooling the different types of 
products bought. Figure 4 shows the time path of the average prices paid in each treatment. On 
average, consumers pay a price of 26.9 in Part II in Baseline, 28.9 in Medium, 38.3 in High, 
 
 
20 
and 28.2 in Unequal.13 Pairwise (two-sided) Wilcoxon rank-sum tests at the consumer (market) 
level for Part II reveal that the differences between High and all the other conditions are 
significant, but none of the differences between other treatments are statistically significant 
(see Table F2 in Appendix F).  
 
Table 6: GLS (random-effects) regressions 
 
(1) 
Prices 
All products 
(2) 
Markup 
All products 
(3) 
Markup 
Harmful product 
(4) 
Markup 
Fair product 
Medium 0.244 0.819 0.450 0.876 
 (1.073) (0.642) (0.616) (1.041) 
High -0.632 -1.006 -0.749 -8.004*** 
 (1.079) (0.702) (0.776) (2.106) 
Unequal -1.981 0.388 0.678 0.916 
 (1.642) (0.689) (0.871) (1.346) 
Part II -0.678 -1.218** -1.058*** -0.194 
 (0.527) (0.533) (0.381) (0.683) 
Part II x Medium 1.725 1.328 0.284 3.366 
 (1.881) (1.559) (0.686) (2.472) 
Part II x High 13.311*** 9.435*** 2.946*** 17.370*** 
 (2.436) (2.693) (0.677) (3.546) 
Part II x Unequal 2.022* 1.404 0.021 3.151 
 (1.039) (0.930) (0.569) (2.348) 
Constant 27.617*** 3.604*** 3.007*** 3.276*** 
 (0.829) (0.486) (0.555) (0.748) 
Observations 7,469 7,469 3,080 2,362 
Number of subjects 252 252 211 198 
Notes. Medium, High and Unequal are binary variables taking on value 1 in the respective treatments and 0 
otherwise. Part II is a binary variable taking on value 1 for data from period 11 to 30 and 0 otherwise. Baseline 
and Part I serve as omitted categories. Models (1) and (2) include all product types. Model (3) focuses on the 
most harmful (“harmful”) product and Model (4) on the least harmful (“fair”) product. Standard errors (in 
parentheses) are clustered at the market level. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 
In order to test the relationships in Figure 4, Model (1) in Table 6 reports random-effects 
regressions of prices. The coefficients for Part II x Medium, Part II x High, and Part II x 
Unequal are all positive, but the coefficients on Part II x Medium and Part II x Unequal are 
small and only the latter is marginally statistically significant. The coefficient for Part II x High 
is much larger and significant at the one percent level. Thus, a substantial increase in income, 
from 100 to 400, has a pronounced and significant impact on overall price levels, while a more 
                                                          
13 The average prices across treatments paid in Part I can be found in Table F1 in Appendix F. 
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moderate increase in (average) income, from 100 to 200, causes directionally identical but 
small and statistically weak changes.  
An increase in prices alone could be due to either consumers buying products that are 
more socially responsible and costlier to produce or to firms charging higher markups. 
Therefore, we next consider the markup associated with products sold, i.e., the difference 
between price and production cost. The average markup paid in Part II across all product types 
is 2.4 in the Baseline, 4.6 in Medium, 10.8 in High and 4.1 in Unequal.14 Products trade with 
higher markups when consumers have higher incomes but, again, only the differences in 
markups between High and all other conditions are robustly statistically significant (see 
Wilcoxon rank-sum tests at the consumer (market) level in Table G2 in Appendix G). 
Regression Model (2) in Table 6, using markups as the dependent variable, confirms these 
results. The coefficients for Part II x Medium, Part II x Unequal, and Part II x High are all 
positive, suggesting that markups increase with income, but the coefficients for Part II x 
Medium and Part II x Unequal are small and not significant, while the coefficient for Part II x 
High is much larger and significant at the one percent level. Thus, despite the high levels of 
firm competition in our design—recall that any of the six firms can sell up to six units, while 
each of the six consumers can buy at most one unit—firms seem to capture part of the 
consumers’ income growth through higher markups.  
Importantly, however, the increased markups are not equivalent across different product 
types. Figure 5 displays the time path of markups for the two most extreme and most common 
product types. The most harmful product type, imposing a combined loss of 60, was exchanged 
in about 41 percent of all cases; the least harmful product type, imposing no loss at all, was 
exchanged in about 32 percent of all cases. We henceforth refer to these as the “harmful” and 
“fair” products, respectively. The left panel reveals that the markup for the harmful product 
differs only slightly across treatments. Markups quickly converge to low levels of about 2.5 in 
Part I and remain, with some variation in High, at this level throughout Part II. Overall, average 
markups for the harmful product are very similar across conditions in Part II (1.6 in Baseline, 
2.3 in Medium, 3.5 in High, and 2.8 in Unequal).15 For the fair product, however, we observe 
a different pattern of markups in Part II, as shown in the right panel of Figure 5. All three 
treatments with income increases yield markups for the fair product that are substantially higher 
than the fair-product markup in the Baseline. The additional markup for the fair product is 
                                                          
14 The average markups across treatments paid in Part I can be found in Table G1 in Appendix G. 
15 The two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum tests detect only weakly significant treatment differences in Part II, despite 
quantitatively small differences overall, as shown in Table G4 in Appendix G. 
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evident in the first few periods of Part II in all three treatments with income increases and 
becomes even larger over time in High. Compared to Baseline, markups are more than twice 
as large in Medium and Unequal and more than four times higher in High (3.4 in Baseline, 7.8 
in Medium, 14.8 in High, 8.0 in Unequal).16  
 
Figure 5: Markup by product type  
 
 
Notes: The “harmful” product imposes a combined loss of 60 on the third parties, and the “fair” product 
imposes zero loss on the third parties. 
 
The final two models in Table 6 present regressions that study how markups vary by 
treatment for each product type. Model (3) considers only the harmful product, while Model 
(4) considers only the fair product. Both models show that the increase in the markup is 
significant only for High and that the increase is five times as large for the fair product as for 
the harmful product. That is, there are higher markups when consumers have a substantial 
increase in income and particularly so for the fair product.  
                                                          
16 The differences between Baseline and each of the other treatments are statistically significant at least at the 
consumer level using two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum tests (see Table G6 in Appendix G). 
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While we are cautious not to make too much of these unexpected results regarding 
prices and markups, the above analysis raises the possibility that firms screen consumers and 
use the information revealed by responsible consumption choices to establish higher markups 
for socially responsible products. This observation has implications for how income growth 
among consumers will translate into market shares of socially responsible products and for the 
profitability of different kinds of products. It is common knowledge in High that consumers 
have a substantially higher initial per-period income in Part II than in Part I. Consumers reveal 
additional information about their social concern by buying socially responsible products—
i.e., they reveal not to be entirely self-interested but to have a willingness to pay for avoiding 
negative impact. Firms apparently exploit this information and capture part of the consumers’ 
income growth by asking for higher markups. Hence, part of the impact of increased social 
responsibility in response to increased income seems to be captured in higher profit margins 
for socially responsible products.  
 
5 Conclusion 
We investigate the relationship between consumers’ income and their willingness to voluntarily 
internalize negative externalities produced by their market behavior, a form of social 
responsibility. Despite the intuitive appeal that socially responsible market conduct is a normal 
good, as conjectured by Shleifer (2004) and Bénabou and Tirole (2010), there is a lack of 
compelling evidence that this is indeed the case. Given the potential social benefits from such 
voluntary internalization, a positive relationship with income would be important from a policy 
perspective, as it would dictate that some negative social impacts may be mitigated through 
voluntary consumer actions as societies experience economic growth. 
 We begin by documenting that a positive relationship exists in national level shares of 
expenditures on one kind of socially responsible product—specifically, Fair Trade products—
and GDP per capita. The cross-country relationship is strongly positive, suggesting that socially 
responsible consumption is a normal good. However, there are many other factors that may 
differ between countries—or even across a single country over time—making causal inference 
from such data questionable. Nevertheless, this analysis provides suggestive evidence that 
social responsibility may, in fact, be a normal good. 
 To obtain causal evidence of the relationship between income and market social 
responsibility, we conduct a laboratory experiment that creates a stylized product market with 
varying product types that differ in their degree of negative social impact. More socially 
responsible products cost more to produce, meaning that consumers have to be willing to pay 
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for such products in order for them to be sufficiently profitable for firms to provide. Using this 
design, we introduce exogenous positive shocks to consumers’ incomes in order to identify the 
resulting effect of such income growth on socially responsible consumption.  
 Our results corroborate the observation from cross-national comparisons that indicate a 
positive relationship between income and the willingness to pay for products that mitigate 
social impact. This effect is always positive in our experiment, though it is only substantial and 
statistically significant when we implement large increases in consumers’ incomes. 
Nevertheless, the magnitude of these income increases is not implausible, and corresponds to 
recent ten-year levels of growth in at least some developing countries. Moreover, when we 
pool all of our treatments and estimate the aggregate effect of income increases, we find a 
substantial and statistically strong positive effect. 
Admittedly, our laboratory evidence comes at the cost of generalizability. Still it is 
important to document that increased income can yield more socially responsible consumption, 
which our study achieves in a much more controlled manner than is possible using naturally 
occurring data. Moreover, similar designs have previously demonstrated concordance between 
laboratory behavior and purchasing decisions involving real products (Engelmann et al. 2018). 
We find that such a relationship also exists in our data, using self-reported measures of non-
laboratory purchasing behavior.  
 Our results also produce additional interesting insights that may be relevant for 
understanding the consequences of increasing income in real-world product markets involving 
the possibility of socially responsible production. First, we find little evidence that relative 
income concerns matter much in determining social responsibility. Consumers respond to 
income increases fairly consistently, regardless of whether others’ incomes also increase. 
Second, we find an asymmetry in how different kinds of products are marked up in response 
to consumers’ rising income. In particular, firms seem to raise prices considerably more for the 
most socially responsible types of products and, importantly, consumers are willing to pay 
these higher prices despite the presence of firm competition. Thus, as consumers become 
richer, the price for the least socially conscious products does not change much, but the prices 
for those products with the most positive social impact experience sharp increases, particularly 
as consumers become much richer. Thus, one consequence of increased consumer income may 
be greater potential profits for firms selling to the most socially conscious consumers, as these 
become less price sensitive. However, our experiment provides only limited data in addressing 
these issues, making it important to explore further the effects of increasing consumers’ 
incomes on socially responsible market outcomes. 
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Appendix  
A. Country Level Data on Income and Consumption of Fair Trade Products  
The 17 graphs below illustrate the correlation between the share of Fair Trade products and the 
GDP per capita per country from 2004 to 2013. We selected the countries for which we were 
able to obtain spending data on fair trade products from 2004. As previously, our calculations 
are based on data from the World Bank database and Fairtrade Labelling Organizations 
International (FLO), Annual Reports 2005/06 to 2013/14. GDP in 2013 US dollars. 
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B. Interfaces for Firms’ and Consumers’ Decisions 
For Firms: They can select the product type they want to sell, and determine a price for their 
product offer. 
 
  
 
 
32 
For Consumers: They decide which product they want to buy if any. 
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C. Feedback Received by Participants at the End of Each Period 
For Firms: They observe the offers made by all firms and their respective payments. 
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For Consumers: They observe the effect of their purchasing decision on the payments of the 
third parties. 
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For Third-Parties: They can only observe their payment. 
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D. Questionnaire Data 
Table D1: Detailed description of the variables from the questionnaire 
Variables Description 
Female 0- No (Male); 1- Yes 
Age  In years 
Study Field of study  1- Economics, 0- Other 
Parents’ 
education 
What is the highest degree or level of education completed by either of your parents? 
0 - don't know / no answer, 1 - did not complete Medium school, 2 - Medium school, 
3 - some college (i.e. university), 4 - bachelor's degree, 5 - master's degree, 6 - 
advanced graduate work or Ph.D. 
Disposable 
income 
How much money (CHF) do you have at your disposal each month (approximately, 
after housing costs)? 
Relative 
income 
How do you think your income and financial situation currently compare to those of 
others in Switzerland who are of similar age? 
0 - don't know / no answer, 1 - much below average, 2 - somewhat below average, 3 - 
about the average, 4 - somewhat above average, 5 - much above average 
Family 
income 
Approximately, what was the highest total gross income obtained by your parents in 
any past year? 
0 - don't know / no answer, 1 - under CHF 50'000, 2 - CHF 50'000 to 100'000, 3 - 
CHF 100'000 to CHF 150'000, 4 - CHF 150'000 to CHF 200'000, 5 - above CHF 
200'000 
Responsible 
consumption 
How often do you buy socially responsible products (e.g. fair trade, sweatshop-free, 
environmentally friendly) when such products are available? (select the response that 
best describes your behavior): 
0 - don't know / no answer, 1 - never, 2 - sometimes, 3 - often, 4 - always 
Responsible 
purchase 
Suppose that you want to buy a jacket. One jacket costs CHF 100 and it is produced 
in a sweatshop (i.e., a factory where manual workers are employed at low wages for 
long hours and under poor and often unsafe conditions). How much would you pay 
for the exact same jacket but sweatshop-free? 
Donation to 
charity 
Approximately, how much money do you donate per year to charitable causes (in 
CHF)? 
Political 
orientation 
Where would you classify yourself on the left/right political spectrum?  
from 1 (left-wing) to 9 (right-wing). 
Political party To which Swiss political party do you feel closest?  
Work How many hours do you work per week, alongside your studies (during the semester)? 
Fair market 1 The free market system is a fair system. * 
Fair market 2 Common or "normal" business practices must be fair, or they would not survive. * 
Fair market 3 Acting in response to market forces is not always a fair way to conduct business. * (-) 
Fair market 4 In free market systems, people tend to get the outcomes that they deserve. * 
Fair market 5 Profitable businesses tend to be more morally responsible than unprofitable 
businesses.* 
Fair market 6 Economic markets do not fairly reward people.* (-) 
* Concerning their beliefs about fairness in market, they have to select one of the eleven answers which 
best describes their present agreement or disagreement with the statement, from "Completely disagree" 
to "Completely agree" (from -5 to 5). 
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Table D2: Descriptive statistics 
Variable N Mean SD 
Female 756 (252) 0.53 (0.54) 0.50 (0.50) 
Age 756 (252) 23.65 (23.68) 4.32 (4.69) 
Study 756 (252) 0.08 (0.08) 0.27 (0.27) 
Parents’ education 518 (180) 4.64 (4.69) 0.95 (1.00) 
Disposable income 733 (247) 797.00 (829.76) 1257.50 (1384.72) 
Relative income 727 (244) 2.15 (2.27) 1.02 (1.04) 
Family income 541 (181) 2.40 (2.54) 1.27 (1.23) 
Donation to charity 752 (252) 90.87 (93.20) 264.70 (339.95) 
Responsible consumption 718 (244) 0.43 (0.43) 0.50 (0.50) 
Responsible purchase 753 (252) 142.76 (146.60) 54.74 (60.07) 
Political orientation 756 (252) 4.04 (4.09) 1.77 (1.74) 
Work 741 (250) 6.93 (6.97) 10.62 (10.69) 
Fair Market 1 756 (252) -0.60 (-0.36) 2.74 (2.69) 
Fair Market 2 756 (252) -0.70 (-0.80) 2.88 (2.91) 
Fair Market 3 756 (252) 2.01 (2.14) 2.32 (2.33) 
Fair Market 4 756 (252) -1.41 (-1.10) 2.63 (2.63) 
Fair Market 5 756 (252) -1.91 (-1.87) 2.54 (2.67) 
Fair Market 6 756 (252) 1.45 (1.37) 2.37 (2.39) 
Market fairness** 756 (252) -0.00 (0.06) 0.76 (0.76) 
 
** We use a factor analysis on answers to questions about fairness in markets, and create a univariate 
measure of the extent to which participants believe that markets are fair called Market fairness. Note that  
Fair Market 3 and Fair Market 6 are reverse coded. 
 
Notes. The descriptive statistics in brackets concern buyers only. For each variable, we excluded 
participants that did not reply to the question or provided implausible answers. 
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E. Social Responsibility  
Table E1: Percentage of the total potential loss mitigated 
 Part I Part II 
Baseline 37.95 % 45.25 % 
Medium 34.25 % 42.86 % 
High 29.56 % 74.54 % 
Unequal 29.63 % 40.64 % 
 
Table E2: Wilcoxon rank-sum tests at the consumer (market) level, two-sided 
p-values Baseline Medium High Unequal 
Baseline - 0.8131 (0.9397) 0.3117 (0.4477) 0.3349 (0.5980) 
Medium 0.8335 (0.6501) - 0.2638 (0.3290) 0.3126 (0.4292) 
High 0.0002 (0.0393) 0.0000 (0.0092) - 0.6399 (0.4610) 
Unequal 0.4835 (0.6732) 0.5804 (0.7121) 0.0000 (0.0007) - 
 
Notes. The p-values in the shaded area correspond to Part I and the rest to Part II. 
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Table E3: GLS (random-effects) regression of the percent loss mitigated 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Medium -0.023 3.365 -8.772 -1.171 0.789 
 (9.591) (9.213) (10.992) (9.744) (9.386) 
High -7.667 -5.662 -9.898 -9.633 -8.701 
 (12.673) (12.731) (12.142) (12.600) (12.888) 
Unequal -7.712 -5.531 -8.601 -8.259 -7.629 
 (9.007) (8.905) (10.175) (9.167) (9.023) 
Part II 7.473* 7.046* 6.712 7.473* 7.473* 
 (4.124) (4.046) (4.862) (4.124) (4.124) 
Part II x Medium 2.334 2.936 5.058 2.334 2.334 
 (6.463) (6.541) (6.780) (6.463) (6.463) 
Part II x High 36.693*** 38.282*** 36.728*** 36.693*** 36.693*** 
 (9.629) (9.558) (9.522) (9.629) (9.629) 
Part II x Unequal 3.581 4.020 4.888 3.581 3.581 
 (5.233) (5.250) (6.158) (5.233) (5.233) 
Female 1.180 4.503 8.762* 1.426 2.345 
 (4.416) (4.229) (4.862) (4.515) (4.264) 
Age (log) 11.224 1.299 5.194 14.875 5.879 
 (13.086) (13.107) (15.138) (14.133) (13.805) 
Disposable income (log) -7.203***   -6.628** -6.344** 
 (2.775)   (2.710) (2.915) 
Relative income  -0.506    
  (2.196)    
Family income   2.988*   
   (1.609)   
Responsible 
consumption 
12.212*** 
(4.121) 
12.192*** 
(4.093) 
6.519 
(5.265) 
 12.102*** 
(4.280) 
Responsible purchase    0.052*  
    (0.029)  
Donation to charity 0.017*** 0.015 0.012** 0.016*** 0.017*** 
 (0.004) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Political orientation -2.650** -2.575* -1.293 -3.361**  
 (1.288) (1.332) (1.503) (1.392)  
Market fairness     -6.873** 
     (2.730) 
Constant 49.807 33.135 11.976 35.874 50.060 
 (42.875) (45.776) (51.037) (44.416) (44.583) 
Observations 7,170 6,930 5,160 7,170 7,170 
Number of Subjects 239 231 172 239 239 
 
Notes. Medium, High and Unequal are binary variables taking on the value 1 in the respective treatment, 
and 0 otherwise. Baseline serves as omitted category in all models. Part II is a binary variable taking on 
value 1 for data generated from period 11 to 30 and 0 from period 1 to 10. We excluded participants that 
either did not reveal their disposable income or reported zero, nor indicated how often they buy fair 
products. In addition, we excluded participants that did not reply to the question about their relative 
income in regression 2 or about their family income in regression 3. Standard errors (in parentheses) are 
clustered at the market level. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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F. Prices 
Table F1: Average prices paid by consumers  
 Part I Part II 
Baseline 27.40 26.91 
Medium 27.89 28.89 
High 25.46 38.27 
Unequal 26.95 28.18 
 
Table F2: Wilcoxon rank-sum tests at the consumer (market) level, two-sided 
p-values Baseline Medium High Unequal 
Baseline - 0.5659 (0.8206) 0.0179 (0.2781) 0.3170 (0.6353) 
Medium 0.3250 (0.5967) - 0.0030 (0.1931) 0.0677 (0.4606) 
High 0.0000 (0.0034) 0.0000 (0.0227) - 0.0350 (0.3379) 
Unequal 0.6488 (0.8330) 0.3909 (0.9161) 0.0000 (0.0051) - 
 
Notes. The p-values in the shaded area correspond to Part I and the rest to Part II. 
 
 
 
G. Markups 
a. Markups across all product types 
Table G1: Average markups paid by consumers  
 Part I Part II 
Baseline 3.42 2.36 
Medium 4.44 4.56 
High 2.46 10.82 
Unequal 3.96 4.05 
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Table G2: Wilcoxon rank-sum tests at the consumer (market) level, two-sided 
p-values Baseline Medium High Unequal 
Baseline - 0.0013 (0.0962) 0.0038 (0.1927) 0.1845 (0.6352) 
Medium 0.0089 (0.4961) - 0.0000 (0.0227) 0.0150 (0.3703) 
High 0.0000 (0.0067) 0.0001 (0.0227) - 0.0002 (0.0708) 
Unequal 0.1628 (0.6732) 0.3509 (0.9790) 0.0000 (0.0223) - 
 
Notes. The p-values in the shaded area correspond to Part I and the rest to Part II. 
 
 
b. Markups for “harmful” products 
Table G3: Average markups paid for the “harmful” products by consumers  
 Part I Part II 
Baseline 2.79 1.64 
Medium 3.63 2.28 
High 1.61 3.52 
Unequal 3.31 2.83 
 
 
Table G4: Wilcoxon rank-sum tests at the consumer (market) level, two-sided 
p-values Baseline Medium High Unequal 
Baseline - 0.0291 (0.2899) 0.0012 (0.1931) 0.5890 (0.8330) 
Medium 0.0714 (0.4963) - 0.0000 (0.0301) 0.1116 (0.4291) 
High 0.0006 (0.0979) 0.0366 (0.4624) - 0.0003 (0.1215) 
Unequal 0.8643 (1.0000) 0.1668 (0.4605) 0.0070 (0.2149) - 
 
Notes. The p-values in the shaded area correspond to Part I and the rest to Part II. 
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c. Markups for “fair” products 
Table G5: Average markups paid for the “fair” products by consumers  
 Part I Part II 
Baseline 2.83 3.40 
Medium 3.63 7.80 
High 3.64 14.83 
Unequal 4.04 8.00 
 
 
Table G6: Wilcoxon rank-sum tests at the consumer (market) level, two-sided 
p-values Baseline Medium High Unequal 
Baseline - 0.7051 (1.0000) 0.2625 (0.9024) 0.5052 (0.9012) 
Medium 0.0029 (0.4497) - 0.4747 (0.7133) 0.7375 (0.9259) 
High 0.0000 (0.0067) 0.0265 (0.1037) - 0.6764 (0.7673) 
Unequal 0.0129 (0.2463) 0.4463 (0.9161) 0.0027 (0.0553) - 
 
Notes. The p-values in the shaded area correspond to Part I and the rest to Part II. 
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H. Experimental Instructions  
In the following, we provide the instructions for Part I, and the instructions for Part II for the 
treatments Baseline, Medium, High and Unequal.   
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General instructions 
 
 
We are pleased to welcome you to this economic study. 
Please read the following instructions carefully. You can—depending on your decisions and/or 
those of the other participants—earn money in addition to the 15 Swiss francs that you receive 
as an initial participation payment. It is thus very important that you read the instructions 
carefully.  
This study will have two parts. Part I lasts 10 periods and Part II lasts 20 periods. The entire 
study will thus last for 30 periods.  
In addition to the initial participation payment of 15 Swiss francs, you will be paid your 
earnings from one randomly selected period. That is, the computer will randomly select one 
period out of 30 at the end of the study to count for payment. Since you do not know which 
period the computer will randomly select, you must consider your decisions in each of the 30 
periods very carefully. 
During the study, we will not speak of Swiss francs, but of points. The points you earn during 
the study will be converted to Swiss francs at the end of the study. The following conversion 
rate applies: 
6 points = 2 Swiss francs 
At the end of today’s study, you will receive your payment in cash.  
We will explain the exact procedures for Part I on the next pages. You will receive 
instructions about all changes, if any, to the procedures prior to the start of Part II. Note that 
the decisions taken in Part I of the study do not influence the procedures for Part II. 
Communication with the other participants is strictly forbidden during the study. 
Violation of this rule will lead to exclusion from the study and loss of all payments. 
For the sake of simplicity, we will always use male forms of pronouns for participants; the 
instructions obviously also refer to female participants. 
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A. THE MARKET ACTIVITY 
In all periods in Parts I and II, you will participate in the same market activity, described below. 
► Market participants 
There are three types of participants in this study: Participants A, B, and C. Participants A are 
sellers and Participants B are buyers. Participants C can neither sell nor buy, but they 
can incur losses due to the transactions between Participants A and B. 
The participants are divided into groups of 18 people. There are six Participants A (sellers), six 
Participants B (buyers), and six Participants C in each group.  
You will see whether you are Participant A, B, or C on your screen at the beginning of the 
study. Your role as Participant A, B, or C will remain the same during the entire study. 
► Market products 
In the market activity, different types of product can be exchanged, i.e. sold and bought. The 
type of product refers to the loss that exchanging a product imposes on Participants C. A 
product only creates a loss when it is sold by a Participant A (seller) to a Participant B (buyer).  
Each possible type of product produces a particular loss for the six Participants C, as shown in 
Table 1. The individual loss is the loss that the product imposes on each Participant C. This 
can be any value from 0 to 10. Because there are six Participants C who all incur the same loss 
from a product, the total combined loss produced by a product corresponds to the individual 
loss multiplied by six, and is between 0 and 60. For example, if the individual loss from a 
product is 5 points for each of the six Participants C then the combined loss produced by this 
product is 6  5 = 30 points.  
Each type of product entails a production cost for Participant A when the product is sold. The 
production cost is between 20 and 30 points and depends on the type of product. Lower 
production costs imply higher losses for Participants C. Specifically, each decrease in the 
production cost of 1 point induces a 1-point increase in the individual loss for each Participant 
C (and, hence, a 6-point increase in the combined loss for all Participants C). Table 1 shows 
the exact production cost for each type of product.  
All products are worth 70 points to Participants B (buyers) when they are bought, regardless 
of what type of product it is.  
 
Please take a moment to look over the following table carefully. It is important for 
understanding how earnings in this study are determined. 
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Table 1: Types of products and corresponding production costs 
Type of product 
(Combined and individual losses for Cs produced by this product)  
Production 
cost 
 
    Combined loss of 60   Individual loss of 10 20 
    Combined loss of 54   Individual loss of 9 21 
    Combined loss of 48   Individual loss of 8 22 
    Combined loss of 42   Individual loss of 7 23 
    Combined loss of 36   Individual loss of 6 24 
    Combined loss of 30   Individual loss of 5 25 
    Combined loss of 24   Individual loss of 4 26 
    Combined loss of 18   Individual loss of 3 27 
    Combined loss of 12   Individual loss of 2 28 
    Combined loss of 6   Individual loss of 1 29 
    Combined loss of 0   Individual loss of 0 30 
 
► Market procedures 
♦ Each Participant A (seller) can make one sales offer in each period, by entering it on the 
following screen: 
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 More specifically, each Participant A must indicate: 
- The type of product he would like to offer. To do this, he must click on the 
corresponding type of product. 
- The price of the product. The corresponding number must be entered in the box. The 
price may be any integer between the production cost of the chosen product up to a 
maximum of 70. 
Once a Participant A has made his decisions, he must click on the OK button at the bottom 
right of the screen. Note that the type of product and the price can be changed until the OK 
button is clicked. 
Once all six Participants A have made their sales offers, they will be informed about the sales 
offers (price and type of product) made by all Participants A. This information will be on a 
screen like the one below: 
 
 
A participant’s own sales offer is always marked in blue. In the column on the right, 
Participants A will see how many Participants B (buyers) accept each of the offers, i.e. the 
quantity of the product sold by each of the six Participants A.  
Each Participant B will make his decision by selecting from one of the six offers, or deciding 
not to purchase a product. A maximum of 6 products can thus be sold in a given period. These 
products can be sold by the same or by different Participants A. Therefore, each Participant A 
can sell between 0 and 6 products in a period. 
Once all Participants B have made their decisions, each Participant A will learn the payments 
of all Participants A. Participants A will also be informed about each Participant B’s purchasing 
decisions and payments. Finally, Participants A will learn the losses incurred by Participants C 
due to the product(s) he sold. 
 
This is where Participants A 
see the quantity of products 
sold for every sales offer 
This is where Participants A see 
the price of the product for 
every sales offer 
This is where Participants A see the 
type of product for every sales offer 
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♦ Each Participant B (buyer) can decide whether or not to accept at most one offer. In each 
period, they can see the six sales offers on a screen like the one below: 
 
 
 
The prices appear in the left column of the table, and the type of product appears in the right 
column. Each offer is always in a separate row.  
- If a Participant B wants to accept an offer, he must first click on the corresponding row. 
The marked row will then appear with a blue background. In order to accept the offer 
marked in blue, Participant B must click on the ACCEPT button. Note that the choice 
of offer can be changed until the ACCEPT button is clicked. 
- If a Participant B does not want to accept any offer, he must click on the DO NOT 
ACCEPT AN OFFER button. Note that even if a row had already been marked, all 
offers will be declined if the DO NOT ACCEPT AN OFFER button is clicked. 
When all Participants B have made their decisions, each Participant B will learn of his own 
payment and the corresponding losses incurred by Participants C based on his decision. 
 
♦ Participants C cannot make any decisions during this study. We ask Participants C, however, 
to indicate in each period their expectations about the behaviors of Participants A (sellers) and 
B (buyers). 
When all Participants A and B have made their decisions, Participants C will learn of their own 
payments, which are entirely dependent on the decisions of Participants A and B. These 
payments depend on the type of products exchanged: Each time a product is exchanged, each 
of the six Participants C incurs the associated individual loss from that product, which is 
between 0 and 10 points. Since up to 6 products can be exchanged, the sum of the individual 
losses incurred by each Participant C is between 0 and 60 points.  
After all participants have been informed about their payments in a period, the next period will 
begin.  
 
Note that, during each period, you will see a timer in the top right corner of your screen. Please 
use the time indicated by the timer to make your decision.  
  
This is where Participants B see the type 
of product for every sales offer 
This is where Participants B see the price 
of the product for every sales offer 
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B. PAYMENTS OF PARTICIPANTS 
In each period, each Participant A, B, and C initially receives an endowment of 100 points. 
The payments in points of Participant A (seller), Participant B (buyer), and Participant C in a 
period are then determined as follows: 
 
 
► Participant A’s payment: 
100  +  quantity sold    (price  –  production cost)     
    where the production cost, between 20 and 30, depends on the type of product offered, as  
    shown in Table 1. 
    Note: if no Participant B accepts Participant A’s sales offer, A’s payment is 100. 
 
► Participant B’s payment: 
- If Participant B makes a purchase: 
100 + 70 – price 
- If Participant B does not make a purchase, his payment is 100. 
 
 
► Participant C’s payment: 
100 – sum of individual losses 
where the sum of individual losses is the sum of the individual losses for a Participant C 
resulting from all products that are exchanged. 
 
Note: if all six Participants B purchase a product with the smallest possible individual loss 
(0) for Participants C or do not purchase a product, Participants C’s payment is 100; if all six 
Participants B purchase a product with the largest possible individual loss (10) for each 
Participant C, Participant C’s payment is 40. 
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C. EXAMPLES 
► Example 1 
Assume that a Participant A (seller) offers a product with a combined loss of 30 points (i.e. an 
individual loss of 5 points) at the price of 40 and all six Participants B (buyers) accept this 
offer. The following payments will result: 
 
• A product with a combined loss of 30 points for Participants C costs 25 points to 
produce (see Table 1 on Page 3). The Participant A’s payment is thus equal to:  
100 + quantity sold  (price – production cost) = 100 + 6  (40 – 25) = 190 
 
• Each Participant B purchased a product. Therefore, each Participant B’s payment is 
equal to: 
100 + 70 – price = 100 + 70 – 40 = 130 
• When a product with a combined loss of 30 points is sold, it imposes an individual loss 
of 5 points on each of the six Participants C. Since six products are sold, the sum of the 
individual losses for a Participant C is equal to 30 points (6  5). Each Participant C’s 
payment is thus equal to: 
100 –  sum of individual losses = 100 – 6  5 = 100 – 30 = 70. 
 
► Example 2 
Assume that four Participants B (buyers) accept an offer for a product with a combined loss of 
18 points (i.e. individual loss of 3 points). The remaining two Participants B accept an offer 
for a product with a combined loss of 42 points (i.e. individual loss of 7 points). Here we focus 
on the payments to each Participant C: 
When a product with a combined loss of 18 points is sold, it imposes an individual loss of 3 
points on each of the six Participants C. Since four products of this type are sold, each 
Participant C thus incurs a loss of 12 points (4 X 3) from these products.  
 
In addition, when a product with a combined loss of 42 points is sold, it imposes an individual 
loss of 7 points on each of the six Participants C. Since two products of this type are sold, each 
Participant C thus incurs a loss of 14 points (2 X 7) from these two products.  
 
Each Participant C’s payment is thus equal to: 
100 –  sum of individual losses = 100 –  (4  3) – (2  7) = 100 – 12 – 14 = 74 
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 Instructions for Part II 
 
 
A. THE MARKET GAME 
As previously announced, the market activity remains the same in Part II. 
► Participants A are sellers. At the beginning of each period, each Participant A makes an 
offer to sell a product. To do so, he has to determine the price and the type (i.e. the losses for 
Participants C) of the product he would like to offer. 
► Participants B are buyers. Each Participant B can then choose to buy one product from one 
of the Participants A, or can choose not to buy a product. 
► Participants C can neither sell nor buy, but they can incur losses due to the transactions 
between Participants A and B. 
Your role in Part II is the same as it was in Part I. 
B. PAYMENTS OF PARTICIPANTS 
In Part II, the way payments are determined by the market activity is the same as in Part I. 
In each period, each Participant A, B, and C initially receives an endowment of 100 points as 
in Part I.  
The payments of Participant A (seller), Participant B (buyer), and Participant C in a period are 
thus determined as follows: 
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► Participant A’s payment: 
100  +  quantity sold    (price  –  production cost)   
    where the production cost, between 20 and 30, depends on the type of product offered, as  
    shown in Table 1. 
    Note: if no Participant B accepts Participant A’s sales offer, Participant A’s payment is 100. 
 
► Participant B’s payment: 
- If Participant B makes a purchase: 
100  +  70  –  price 
- If Participant B does not make a purchase, his payment is 100. 
 
 
► Participant C’s payment: 
100 – sum of individual losses 
where the sum of individual losses is the sum of the individual losses for a Participant C 
resulting from all products that are exchanged. 
 
Note: if all six Participants B purchase a product with the smallest possible individual loss 
(0) for Participants C or do not purchase a product, Participants C’s payment is 100; if all six 
Participants B purchase a product with the largest possible individual loss (10) for each 
Participant C, Participant C’s payment is 40. 
 
To summarize: Part II is identical to Part I. 
Do you have any further questions? If yes, please raise your hand. We will come to you at your 
workplace. Otherwise, we ask you to click the “OK” button. 
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 Instructions for Part II 
 
 
A. THE MARKET GAME 
As previously announced, the market activity remains the same in Part II. 
► Participants A are sellers. At the beginning of each period, each Participant A makes an 
offer to sell a product. To do so, he has to determine the price and the type (i.e. the total loss 
for Participant C) of the product he would like to offer. 
► Participants B are buyers. Each Participant B can then choose to buy one product from 
one of the Participants A, or can choose not to buy a product. 
► Participants C can neither sell nor buy, but they can incur losses due to the transactions 
between Participants A and B. 
Your role in Part II is the same as it was in Part I. 
B. PAYMENTS OF PARTICIPANTS 
In Part II, the way payments are determined is different than in Part I. 
In each period, each Participant A and each Participant C initially receives an endowment of 
100 points as in Part I. But the endowments of the Participants B now change. Specifically, 
each Participant B now receives an initial endowment of 200 points in each period.  
The payments of Participant A (seller), Participant B (buyer), and Participant C in a period are 
thus determined as follows: 
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► Participant A’s payment: 
100  +  quantity sold    (price  –  production cost)   
    where the production cost, between 20 and 30, depends on the type of product offered, as  
    shown in Table 1. 
    Note: if no Participant B accepts Participant A’s sales offer, Participant A’s payment is 100. 
 
► Participant B’s payment: 
- If Participant B makes a purchase: 
200  +  70  –  price 
- If Participant B does not make a purchase, his payment is 200. 
 
 
► Participant C’s payment: 
100  – sum of individual losses 
where the sum of individual losses is the sum of the individual losses for a Participant C 
resulting from all products that are exchanged. 
 
Note: if all six Participants B purchase a product with the smallest possible individual loss 
(0) for Participants C or do not purchase a product, Participants C’s payment is 100; if all six 
Participants B purchase a product with the largest possible individual loss (10) for each 
Participant C, Participant C’s payment is 40. 
 
To summarize: Part II is identical to Part I except that the initial endowments of 
Participants B are higher. 
Do you have any further questions? If yes, please raise your hand. We will come to you at 
your workplace. Otherwise, we ask you to click the “OK” button. 
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 Instructions for Part II 
 
 
A. THE MARKET GAME 
As previously announced, the market activity remains the same in Part II. 
► Participants A are sellers. At the beginning of each period, each Participant A makes an 
offer to sell a product. To do so, he has to determine the price and the type (i.e. the total loss 
for Participant C) of the product he would like to offer. 
► Participants B are buyers. Each Participant B can then choose to buy one product from 
one of the Participants A, or can choose not to buy a product. 
► Participants C can neither sell nor buy, but they can incur losses due to the transactions 
between Participants A and B. 
Your role in Part II is the same as it was in Part I. 
B. PAYMENTS OF PARTICIPANTS 
In Part II, the way payments are determined is different than in Part I. 
In each period, each Participant A and each Participant C initially receives an endowment of 
100 points as in Part I. But the endowments of the Participants B now change. Specifically, 
each Participant B now receives an initial endowment of 400 points in each period.  
The payments of Participant A (seller), Participant B (buyer), and Participant C in a period are 
thus determined as follows: 
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► Participant A’s payment: 
100  +  quantity sold    (price  –  production cost)   
    where the production cost, between 20 and 30, depends on the type of product offered, as  
    shown in Table 1. 
    Note: if no Participant B accepts Participant A’s sales offer, Participant A’s payment is 100. 
 
► Participant B’s payment: 
- If Participant B makes a purchase: 
400  +  70  –  price 
- If Participant B does not make a purchase, his payment is 400. 
 
 
► Participant C’s payment: 
100  – sum of individual losses 
where the sum of individual losses is the sum of the individual losses for a Participant C 
resulting from all products that are exchanged. 
 
Note: if all six Participants B purchase a product with the smallest possible individual loss 
(0) for Participants C or do not purchase a product, Participants C’s payment is 100; if all six 
Participants B purchase a product with the largest possible individual loss (10) for each 
Participant C, Participant C’s payment is 40. 
 
To summarize: Part II is identical to Part I except that the initial endowments of 
Participants B are higher. 
Do you have any further questions? If yes, please raise your hand. We will come to you at 
your workplace. Otherwise, we ask you to click the “OK” button. 
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 Instructions for Part II 
 
 
A. THE MARKET GAME 
As previously announced, the market activity remains the same in Part II. 
► Participants A are sellers. At the beginning of each period, each Participant A makes an 
offer to sell a product. To do so, he has to determine the price and the type (i.e. the total loss 
for Participant C) of the product he would like to offer. 
► Participants B are buyers. Each Participant B can then choose to buy one product from one 
of the Participants A, or can choose not to buy a product. 
► Participants C can neither sell nor buy, but they can incur losses due to the transactions 
between Participants A and B. 
Your role in Part II is the same as it was in Part I. 
B. PAYMENTS OF PARTICIPANTS 
In Part II, the way payments are determined is different than in Part I. 
In each period, each Participant A and each Participant C initially receives an endowment of 
100 points as in Part I. But the endowments of some Participants B now change. Specifically, 
four Participants B now each receive an initial endowment of 100 points and two Participants 
B now each receive an initial endowment of 400 points. The endowment that a particular 
Participant B receives will be randomly determined and will be the same for all of Part II. Each 
Participant B will be informed about the amount of their initial endowment on their screen once 
Part II begins.  
The payments of Participant A (seller), Participant B (buyer), and Participant C in a period are 
thus determined as follows: 
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► Participant A’s payment: 
100  +  quantity sold    (price  –  production cost)   
    where the production cost, between 20 and 30, depends on the type of product offered, as  
    shown in Table 1. 
    Note: if no Participant B accepts Participant A’s sales offer, Participant A’s payment is 100. 
 
► Participant B’s payment:  
If Participant B initially receives 100: 
• If Participant B makes a purchase: 
100 + 70 – price 
• If Participant B does not make a purchase, his payment is 100. 
 
If Participant B initially receives 400: 
• If Participant B makes a purchase: 
400 + 70 – price 
• If Participant B does not make a purchase, his payment is 400. 
 
► Participant C’s payment: 
100  – sum of individual losses 
where the sum of individual losses is the sum of the individual losses for a Participant C 
resulting from all products that are exchanged. 
 
Note: if all six Participants B purchase a product with the smallest possible individual loss 
(0) for Participants C or do not purchase a product, Participants C’s payment is 100; if all six 
Participants B purchase a product with the largest possible individual loss (10) for each 
Participant C, Participant C’s payment is 40. 
 
To summarize: Part II is identical to Part I except that the initial endowments of some 
Participants B are higher. 
Do you have any further questions? If yes, please raise your hand. We will come to you at your 
workplace. Otherwise, we ask you to click the “OK” button. 
